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1978] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
in earlier territorial concepts of jurisdiction. 5 Such a provincial atti-
tude, however, has little viability as a principle of modern law. 6
Recognition of an in personam foreign decree that adjudicates the
rights of the parties in real property, wherever located, would not
appear to jeopardize the interests of the forum state and would
obviate the need for unnecessary relitigation. It is hoped that the
questionable policy of making judicial relief hinge solely on the
language of the complaint or the terms of the foreign court's decree
will be abandoned in future cases.
Frederick J. Dorchak
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW
Right to counsel triggered by court-ordered lineup appearance may
be waived in attorney's absence
New York courts uniformly recognize that the filing of an accu-
satory instrument marks the commencement of formal adversary
proceedings" and thus the time at which a criminal defendant's
general right to counsel attaches. 8 Following the Court of Appeals'
husband executed a deed under threat of contempt, the conveyance would have passed title
to the wife, and New York would have been required to recognize that conveyance. See Fall
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1909); Deschenes v. Tallman, 248 N.Y. 33, 37-38, 161 N.E. 321,
322 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J.); GOODRICH, supra note 67, at 410, 412; notes 72 & 88 supra. Thus,
it seems the real objection is not that a foreign court may cause some ramifications within
the boundaries of a sister state by its judgment. Rather, the opposition appears to be founded
on due process grounds. Just as "[ain attempt to render a personal judgment where there is
no jurisdiction [over the person] is a violation of due process . . .[rendering the judgment]
void in the state where rendered and not entitled to recognition elsewhere," GOODmCH, supra
note 67, at 396 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)) (footnote omitted), so, too,
an exercise of power over land not within the rendering state is seen as "a 'forbidden infringe-
ment' of the interests of the situs state." Reese, supra note 67, at 200.
11 Courts resent infringements on their jurisdiction and, as a result, are quite often
solicitous of other states' sovereignty as well. See, e.g., Davis v. Tremain, 205 N.Y. 236, 98
N.E. 383 (1912); Ames v. Coirre, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1977, at 13, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County); Chesny v. Chesny, 197 Misc. 768, 94 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County),
modified on other grounds mem., 277 App. Div. 879, 98 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1950); 1
WK&M 301.02, at 3-10. In addition to maintaining respect for a sister state's sovereignty,
the local forum may be better able to settle disputes pertaining to realty. 7A WK&M
6301.26.
" Cf. STUMBERO, supra note 67, at 125 (there has been a "decided tendency in the
direction of giving full faith and credit to foreign decrees granted in connection with divorce"
in recent years).
11 E.g., People v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 461, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173-74, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923,
929-30 (1974); People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881,
890 (1974); People v. Poywing, 90 Misc. 2d 197, 200, 393 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1977).
,1 See People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 339-40, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631-32, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881,
890-91 (1974). Initially, the Court of Appeals determined that the right to counsel attached
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decision in People v. Hobson,"5 it was thought that once this right
has attached, a waiver at subsequent critical stages of a prosecu-
tion1°0 could only be effectuated in the presence of an attorney. 10 1
after indictment by a grand jury. People v. DiBiasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200
N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960). In DiBiasi, the Court held that postindictment statements elicited during
a police interrogation in the absence of defendant's attorney were inadmissible at trial. Id.
at 549-51, 166 N.E.2d at 828-29, 200 N.Y.S.2d at 24-25. In People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d
561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961), the postindictment right to counsel was held to
attach whether or not the defendant had already secured an attorney. One year after the
Waterman decision, the Court of Appeals held that for purposes of the right to counsel no
distinction could be made between postarraignment and postindictment statements, People
v. Meyer, 11 N.Y.2d 162, 164, 182 N.E.2d 103, 104, 227 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (1962), and in
People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 278-79, 213 N.E.2d 441, 443, 266 N.Y.S.2d 104, 107 (1965),
the Court concluded that postinformation statements were inadmissible if made in the ab-
sence of counsel.
The right to counsel was first extended to the preindictment stage in People v. Donovan,
13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). The Donovan Court noted previous
decisions in which postarraignment and postindictment statements were suppressed due to
counsel's absence at the time they were obtained, and extended the rule to "condemn...
interrogation of an accused after he or the lawyer retained by him or his family has requested
that they be allowed to confer together." Id. at 152-53, 193 N.E.2d at 630, 243 N.Y.S.2d at
844. Subsequently, the Court applied this principle where the police knew of defendant's
representation but questioned him during a period when his attorney's presence was physi-
cally impossible. People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
In People v. Friedlander, 16 N.Y.2d 248, 212 N.E.2d 533, 265 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1965), it was held
that statements made after defendant was known to be represented by counsel were inadmis-
sible although no specific request to have counsel present at the questioning had been made.
Id. at 250-51, 212 N.E.2d at 534, 265 N.Y.S.2d at 98. Finally in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d
325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968), defendant was unaware that an attorney with
whom he had dealt in the past had requested to see him during interrogation. In suppressing
defendant's statements made after the attorney's request, the Court noted that the right to
counsel attaches once the police know or have reason to know that a defendant is represented
by counsel, and that "this right is not dependent upon the existence of a formal retainer."
Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. Thus, the Donovan-Arthur rule renders
inadmissible any statements elicited in the absence of counsel, from a represented defendant
who is in custody, unless counsel is waived in an attorney's presence. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d
at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. Although characterized at one time as "merely a theoretical
statement," People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 158, 263 N.E.2d 304, 305, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793,
795 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971), this rule recently has been revitalized. See
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481-82, 348 N.E.2d 894, 895, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976).
While the Donovan-Arthur rule generally applies whenever a defendant has retained or been
appointed counsel, there are three recognized exceptions. See People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d
327, 332, 266 N.E.2d 630, 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1971) (counsel must be secured for specific
charges under investigation); People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1969) (statements made by represented defendant while not in custody held admissible);
People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329, 303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969) (spontaneous state-
ments admissible); cf. People v. Vella, 21 N.Y.2d 249, 234 N.E.2d 422, 287 N.Y.S.2d 369
(1967) (confession made after waiver of right to counsel suppressed on grounds that investiga-
tion was related to that for which represented defendant was previously arraigned).
99 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
101 In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Supreme Court determined that the
commencement of adversary judicial proceedings against a defendant signals the beginning
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Recently, the Court in People v. Coleman, 102 apparently expanding
the definition of "formal proceedings," ' 3 determined that a court
order of removal directing the appearance of a defendant at a prear-
raignment lineup is "sufficiently 'judicial' in nature" to invoke a
right to counsel.10 The Coleman Court went on to hold, however,
that where counsel had not been retained or appointed, this right
could be waived at a lineup, despite the absence of an attorney.,0 5
In Coleman, two witnesses to a robbery in Queens County iden-
tified defendant from police photographs as the perpetrator. Several
days later, Coleman was placed in two lineups and positively identi-
fied by both witnesses." 6 Since he had been incarcerated pending
trial on an unrelated charge at the time the lineups were conducted,
defendant's presence at the viewings was secured pursuant to an ex
parte order of removal issued by the New York City Criminal
Court.0 ' Coleman was represented by counsel on the unrelated
charge, but, it was claimed, had waived his right to have an attorney
present at the lineups."'5 On the basis of the photograph and lineup
identifications, Coleman was indicted. 9 He was thereafter con-
victed of two counts of robbery in the first degree. A divided appel-
late division affirmed, and defendant appealed.110
of the critical stage of a prosecution. Id. at 688-89. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7-9
(1970).
101 See notes 119-120 and accompanying text infra.
43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977), rev'g 51 App. Div. 2d 1058,
381 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dep't 1976).
"I See notes 112 & 116 infra.
'o 43 N.Y.2d at 225-26, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60.
'o Id. at 227, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
,o Id. at 224, 371 N.E.2d at 820, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
107 Id.
101 Id. at 226-27, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59-60. Defendant Coleman nodded
affirmatively when he was informed of his right to counsel and "nodded negatively" when
asked if he wished to have an attorney present. Id. at 227, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d
at 60. Despite these indications of waiver, however, Coleman refused to sign a statement
acknowledging that he had been offered access to counsel. Id. It should be noted that the
decision of the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), applies only to
protect the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and has no application to
lineups. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 687-88 (1972). See also United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). The right to counsel at lineups
is actually derived from the due process requirements embodied in the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. See People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 335, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629, 361 N.Y.S.2d
881, 887 (1974).
"1I 43 N.Y.2d at 224, 371 N.E.2d at 820, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 58. Following the indictment a
hearing was held to determine the admissibility of both identifications. The photographic
identifications were suppressed as suggestive, while the lineup identifications were held to
be admissible. Id. at 224, 371 N.E.2d at 820, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59.
110 Id.
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The Coleman Court, in an opinion written by Judge Jasen,
observed that "the filing of an instrument other than one forming
the basis of an arraignment or issuance of an arrest warrant, may
* . . constitute a 'formal' proceeding triggering" the right to coun-
sel."' Characterizing the order of removal as one such instrument,
the Court concluded that a right to counsel attached at the lineups
conducted after its issuance."2
In approaching the question whether this right could be waived
in the absence of counsel, the Court declined to hold that its pre-
vious decision in Hobson required the suppression of the corporeal
viewing identifications. 13 Distinguishing Hobson from the instant
action, the Court noted that, in the former, defendant had been
represented by an attorney at the time of the purported waiver."'
Judge Jasen concluded that since Coleman was not represented on
the charge under investigation, there was no basis for invoking the
rule reestablished in Hobson that "'[o]nce a lawyer has entered a
criminal proceeding . . . the defendant in custody may not waive
his right to counsel in the absence of the lawyer.' "IP15
It is significant that the Coleman Court determined that an
effective waiver of the right to counsel could be made in the absence
of an attorney after the right had attached by virtue of the judicial
order of removal. Assuming the Court intended to equate a court-
Id. at 225, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59; see note 112 infra.
12 43 N.Y.2d at 225, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 59. The Court relied on People
v. Sugden, 35 N.Y.2d 453, 323 N.E.2d 169, 363 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1974). In Sugden, the Court
recognized that "the issuance of a court order of removal is not the type of formal proceeding
requiring the presence of counsel," but determined that the right to counsel "exists at 'critical
stages' held after that order is issued." Id. at 461, 323 N.E.2d at 174, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 929
(citations omitted). That Court, however, never resolved the question whether a defendant
whose presence is secured by a court order of removal could effectively waive the right to
counsel in the absence of an attorney.
"3 43 N.Y.2d at 226, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60. In Hobson, the court-
appointed attorney departed at the conclusion of the lineup. Defendant was then interrogated
without his attorney present. The statements elicited during the attorney's absence were held
to be inadmissible. 39 N.Y.2d at 481, 348 N.E.2d at 896, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 420.
"' 43 N.Y.2d at 226, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60.
115 Id. at 226, 371 N.E.2d at 821, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60 (quoting 39 N.Y.2d 479, 481, 348
N.E.2d 894, 895, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1976)) (citation omitted). The Court's use of the
reaffirmed Donovan-Arthur rule in determining the permissibility of waiver seems anomalous
if the lineups were in fact a critical stage. Postcritical stage waivers are controlled by a
different standard, and although Hobson addressed this area as well, the Coleman Court
ignored that portion of the Hobson opinion which seems applicable. See note 119 infra.
Despite its apparently improper use of a precritical stage rule in a postcritical stage situation,
however, the Court found that, as a matter of law, the prosecution had failed to carry the
burden of showing a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 43 N.Y.2d at
227, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60-61 (citing People v. Paulin, 25 N.Y.2d 445, 450,
255 N.E.2d 164, 166, 306 N.Y.S.2d 929, 933 (1969)).
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ordered removal with other procedures which begin the critical stage
of a prosecution, "6 the situation in Coleman is clearly analogous to
the postcritical stage situation presented to the Court of Appeals in
People v. Lopez."7 In Lopez, the Court held that an unrepresented
defendant against whom formal proceedings had commenced could
waive his right to counsel at interrogation without the presence of
an attorney.' A careful reading of Hobson, however, supports the
conclusion that Lopez was overruled." 9 Consequently, the striking
implication of Hobson is that a postcritical stage right to counsel
cannot be effectively waived in the absence of an attorney, whether
the defendant is represented or unrepresented.10
11 See note 112 and accompanying text supra. In his dissent in People v. Lopez, 28
N.Y.2d 23, 26, 268 N.E.2d 6Z8, 629, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971),
Judge Breitel observed that "[a]fter criminal action is begun, it is no longer a general inquiry
: * * but rather a form of pretrial discovery . . . . In short, the defendant is the all but
irrevocable target and the preparation for his trial has begun." Id. at 28-29, 268 N.E.2d at
631, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 829 (Breitel, J., dissenting). It is difficult to equate Judge Breitel's
remarks with the situation that faced defendant Coleman. Moreover, since the Coleman
Court indicated that the lineups were merely part of a "normal, good faith investigation,"
43 N.Y.2d at 226, 371 N.E.2d at 822, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 60, Coleman's appearance at the
viewings can hardly be characterized as a stage at which the "government [had] committed
itself to prosecute." Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
"7 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971).
The Lopez Court followed People v. Bodie, 16 N.Y.2d 275, 213 N.E.2d 441, 266
N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965), wherein it was held that an unrepresented defendant could waive his
right to counsel without counsel's presence during an interrogation held subsequent to the
filing of an information and issuance of an arrest warrant. 28 N.Y.2d at 25, 268 N.E.2d at
629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 826. Although Lopez involved an indicted defendant, the Lopez Court
found no reason to apply a different rule than that applied in Bodie. Id. at 25, 268 N.E.2d at
629, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 826-27; see 16 N.Y.2d at 279-80, 213 N.E.2d at 443, 266 N.Y.S.2d at
107-08.
"' See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 492-93, 348 N.E.2d 894, 904, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
427 (1976) (Gabrielli, J., concurring); People v. Reyes, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1976, at 11, cols.
5-6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd mem., 57 App. Div. 2d 738, 393 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't
1977); 5 FoRDH m URB. L. J. 401, 409 (1977); The Survey, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 201, 216-22
(1976). See also People v. Cole, 41 N.Y.2d 944, 363 N.E.2d 364, 394 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1977)
(mei.).
"I See 39 N.Y.2d at 491-92, 348 N.E.2d at 903-04, 348 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28 (Gabrielli, J.,
concurring); People v. Reyes, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 18, 1976, at 11, cols. 5-6 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
aff'd mem., 57 App. Div. 2d 738, 393 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1st Dep't 1977). Although Lopez involved
statements made by an unrepresented defendant who had waived his right to counsel without
knowledge that he had been indicted, a careful comparison of Judge Breitel's dissent in that
case with his opinion in Hobson reveals that defendant's unawareness of the indictment was
not the basis upon which Lopez was overruled. The essence of the Lopez dissent was that by
"permitting a theory of waiver of counsel by an uncounselled defendant held incommunicado
to be imported into this stage of the proceedings . . . the right to counsel [is] debased or
negated .... " 28 N.Y.2d at 29, 268 N.E.2d at 632, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 830.
One court has held that the Hobson decision, as it pertains to unrepresented defendants,
only applies to postindictment situations. People v. Babcock, 91 Misc. 2d 921, 399 N.Y.S.2d
103 (Albany County Ct. 1977). In light of the Court of Appeals' determination that formal
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Thus, it is difficult to discern the Coleman Court's purpose in
distinguishing Hobson if, as the opinion suggests, the lineups were
critical stages.'21 It is suggested, therefore, that Judge Jasen's opin-
ion leaves Coleman open to-several interpretations. For example, by
allowing Coleman to waive his right to counsel, the Court may have
intended to limit the Hobson decision.to those situations in which
a defendant is already represented. In that event, the Lopez holding
would seemingly be reinstated. 12 2 Conversely, it may be argued that
by permitting the waiver, the Court was implying that a court-
ordered removal is not the equivalent of other procedures which
usher in the critical stage of a prosecution.12 Read in this way,
Coleman does not affect previous interpretations of Hobson, but
does indicate an unwillingness on the part of the Court to leave a
defendant in Coleman's position wholly, unprotected from the
abuses that may occur during a lineup.'214 Thirdly, although New
proceedings begin with the filing of an accusatory instrument, People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d
331, 339, 320 N.E.2d 625, 631, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 890 (1974), there seems to be little justifica-
tion for so restricting application of the Hobson decision.
12 See note 112 supra. But see note 116 supra.
'= The reinstatement of Lopez would end the differentiation between precritical and
postcritical stage waivers of the right to counsel by unrepresented defendants, with the result
that an accused without counsel could waive that right at any time in the proceedings against
him without the presence of an attorney.
"= See note 112 supra.
1 The right of a criminal defendant to have counsel present at police lineup procedures
was established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The
Wade Court emphasized that eyewitness identifications were recognized as being particularly
untrustworthy. Id. at 228-29; see Levine & Trapp, The Psychology of Criminal Identification:
The Gap from Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1095-1103 (1973); O'Connor, "That's
the Man": A Sobering Study of Eyewitness Identification and the Polygraph, 49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 1, 1-14 (1974). Additionally, the Court reasoned that since suggestive conditions
during a lineup procedure could go unnoticed by either the defendant or the witness, 388 U.S.
at 230-31, a subsequent "conviction may rest on a courtroom identification in fact the fruit
of a suspect pretrial identification which the accused is helpless to subject to effective scru-
tiny at trial. ... Id. at 235. The Wade Court thus concluded that a lineup is a critical
stage of the prosecution and must be conducted in the presence of the defendant's attorney.
Id. at 240.
In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), the Supreme Court imposed a severe limitation
on the Wade decision by holding that the right to counsel does not extend to a prearraignment
lineup, but rather attaches only after the commencement of formal criminal proceedings. Id.
at 689. The decision has been criticized on the ground that the Wade reasoning should apply
to any lineup, whether conducted before or after the critical stage has begun. See, e.g., Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 691-705 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, Right to Counsel at Lineups
- A Pro Forma Right?, 7 SuFFOL U.L. REV. 587, 606-08 (1973).
Consistent with the decision in Kirby, the New York Court of Appeals has determined
that the value of counsel's presence at a lineup conducted prior to the commencement of
formal proceedings is outweighed by the need for quick identity verifications, since delay may
detract from a witness' memory. People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 336-37, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629-
30, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 888 (1974). Accordingly, no right to counsel attaches at corporeal
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York courts have not clearly differentiated between identification
and interrogation situations,"' the Coleman decision may signal a
step towards developing an independent right to counsel applicable
only to corporeal viewing procedures."'
By recognizing that defendant Coleman was not the target of a
criminal prosecution'2 but nevertheless was in some jeopardy as a
result of his involuntary appearance at the lineups, the Court's deci-
sion to recognize a right to counsel is consistent with the view that
an accused is entitled to representation at any procedure where the
absence of an attorney may prejudice his rights as a defendant.l2s
Although it is unfortunate that the decision may be interpreted in
the future as limiting the reach of Hobson, the Coleman decision
does represent an affirmative effort by the Court of Appeals to delin-
eate further the rights of the criminal defendant and may serve to
motivate a more circumspect judicial approach to identification
procedures. 29
Richard F. Markert
viewing procedures involving an unrepresented defendant which are conducted before formal
proceedings have begun. E.g., People v. Gladman, 41 N.Y.2d 123, 130, 359 N.E.2d 420, 425,
390 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 (1976); People v. Morales, 37 N.Y.2d 262, 272, 333 N.E.2d 339, 346,
372 N.Y.S.2d 25, 34 (1975). New York courts have acknowledged, however, the application
of the Donovan-Arthur rule to prearraignment corporeal viewing procedures. See, e.g., People
v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331, 338-40, 320 N.E.2d 625, 629-31, 361 N.Y.S.2d 881, 889-91 (1974);
People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331, 258 N.E.2d 714, 310 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1970) (per curiam);
People v. Poywing, 90 Misc. 2d 197, 201, 393 N.Y.S.2d 888, 890 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
But see People v. Perez, 42 N.Y.2d 971, 367 N.E.2d 867, 398 N.Y.S.2d 269 (1977) (mer.),
wherein denial of defendant's request that an attorney be present at a prearraignment lineup
was found to be proper. Cf. People v. Gursey, 22 N.Y.2d 224, 239 N.E.2d 351, 292 N.Y.S.2d
416 (1968) (represented defendant had right of access to his attorney during blood test).
"I Although the Court of Appeals has acknowledged that "the need for and right to a
lawyer at an identification lineup is insignificant compared to the need in an ensuing interro-
gation," People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 485, 348 N.E.2d 894, 899, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419, 423
(1976), no express distinction has been drawn between the rights of a defendant at the two
procedures. Moreover, at least one court has determined that a waiver of the right to counsel
at a lineup is analogous to a waiver at interrogation. People v. Poywing, 90 Misc. 2d 197, 201,
393 N.Y.S.2d 888, 891 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1977). A careful reading of the Blake decision
lends support to the conclusion that interrogations and lineups are treated alike where waiver
of counsel is at issue. See 35 N.Y.2d at 338-40, 320 N.E.2d at 629-31, 361 N.Y.S.2d at 889-91.
' Effective safeguards are particularly important during identification procedures. In
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the Supreme Court observed that a pretrial
identification may be more critical in determining a defendant's fate than the actual trial:
"[W]ith the State aligned against the accused, the witness the sole jury, and the accused
unprotected against the overreaching, intentional or unintentional, .... [he has] . little
or no effective appeal from the judgment there rendered by the witness--'that's the man.'"
Id. at 235-36.
i See note 116 supra.
,u See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,
226 (1967); note 126 supra.
IN Although Coleman may be intended to apply only to a rather narrow set of circum-
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Unrelated charge exception to Donovan-Arthur right to counsel held
inapplicable where same policemen interrogate defendant on both
charges
Under the Donovan-Arthur rule, 3 ' once the police are aware
that a defendant is represented by counsel, they may not interrogate
him out of the presence of his attorney. Generally, this protection
is not available when the defendant is questioned in connection with
a charge that is unrelated to the charge for which he has obtained
representation.' 3' The courts have recognized an exception to the
stances, the decision raises a number of questions. Can an unrepresented defendant faced
with a lineup effectively waive his right to counsel in the absence of an attorney after the
filing of an accusatory instrument? Would the Court's determination as to the permissibility
of waiver have been the same if the defendant had been involved in an interrogation rather
than a lineup? Is the Court liberalizing the standard for determining when formal adversary
proceedings commence, or has it begun to develop a broader right to counsel at lineups than
that enunciated in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)?
'1 In People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963), the
Court of Appeals held that statements made by a defendant in custody are inadmissible if
made after his request for counsel has been denied or after his attorney has been denied access
to him. This rule was extended in People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292
N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968), wherein the Court held that once the police learn that a defendant is
represented by counsel or an attorney has informed the police that he intends to represent
the defendant, a right to counsel attaches and the police may not question him without the
attorney present. Furthermore, the Arthur Court expanded the right to counsel by holding
that after the right attaches it cannot effectively be waived in the absence of defendant's
attorney. Id. at 329, 239 N.E.2d at 539, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 666. In People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d
155, 263 N.E.2d 304, 314 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 945 (1971), and People
v. Lopez, 28 N.Y.2d 23, 268 N.E.2d 628, 319 N.Y.S.2d 825, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 840 (1971),
the Court of Appeals appeared inclined to weaken the Donovan-Arthur rule. Its vitality was
reaffirmed, however, in People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419
(1976), wherein the Court expressly overruled Robles and Lopez. See The Survey, 51 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 201, 218 (1976). See generally People v. Clark, 41 N.Y.2d 612, 363 N.E.2d 319,
394 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1977); People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 357 N.E.2d 955, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299
(1976).
The Donovan-Arthur rule does not require the suppression of statements made while the
defendant is not in custody. People v. McKie, 25 N.Y.2d 19, 250 N.E.2d 36, 302 N.Y.S.2d
534 (1969). In addition, the spontaneous statements of a detained defendant are admissible
even when made in the absence of counsel. People v. Kaye, 25 N.Y.2d 139, 250 N.E.2d 329,
303 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1969).
'' See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971);
People v. Hetherington, 27 N.Y.2d 242, 265 N.E.2d 530, 317 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1970); People v.
Stanley, 15 N.Y.2d 30, 203 N.E.2d 475, 255 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1964), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 802
(1965); cf. People v. Coleman, 43 N.Y.2d 222, 371 N.E.2d 819, 401 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1977) (repre-
sented suspect not protected by Donovan-Arthur rule at lineup for unrelated charge); People
v. Simons, 22 N.Y.2d 533, 240 N.E.2d 22, 293 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1107 (1969) (defendant held for parole violation may be questioned outside attorney's pres-
ence in connection with criminal charge). The unrelated charge rule was recently reiterated
in People v. Clark, 41 N.Y.2d 612, 363 N.E.2d 319, 394 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1977), wherein the Court
of Appeals stated that "[riepresentation by counsel in a proceeding unrelated to the investi-
gation is insufficient to invoke the [Donovan-Arthur] protections." Id. at 615, 363 N.E.2d
at 321, 394 N.Y.S.2d at 596 (citations omitted).
